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I. INTRODUCTION
Agriculture has relied on plant breeding to improve genetics since
the first domestication of agricultural plants 10,000 years ago.1 More
recently, Gregor Mendel and his hybridization experiments on peas
led to what we know as modern genetics.2 The rise in recombinant-
DNA technology has opened up many possibilities in plant breeding,
including Roundup Ready technology and crop varieties designed to
resist a number of pests.3
* Extension Legal Specialist, Department of Agricultural and Resource Eco-
nomics, College of Agriculture and Natural Resources, University of Maryland. All
thoughts, opinions, and mistakes in the Article reflect on the Author and not the
University of Maryland. He also does not own a piano. The Author would like to
thank the staff of the Texas A&M Law Review for its help in developing this Article
and his invitation to present at the Agriculture, Intellectual Property, and Feeding the
World in the 21st Century Symposium; his student researcher, Mason Grahame; and
his colleagues within the University of Maryland System.
1. See Ania Wieczorek & Mark Wright, History of Agricultural Biotechnology:
How Crop Development Evolved, SCITABLE (2012), http://www.nature.com/scitable/
knowledge/library/history-of-agricultural-biotechnology-how-crop-development-2588
5295 [https://perma.cc/VLW3-G9F4].
2. See id.
3. See Doug Farquhar & Liz Meyer, State Authority to Regulate Biotechnology
Under the Federal Coordinated Framework, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 439 (2007); Eliza-
beth G. Hill, Comment, Nature’s Harvest or Man’s Profit: Environmental Shortcuts in
373
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At the same time, governments and the private sector have sought
to institute regulations for handling the releases of new biotechnology
to ensure the technologies will have limited environmental impacts
and provide safe foods to the public. These rules and requirements
vary from nation to nation.
This Article uses a recent example—the Syngenta AG MIR162 corn
litigation—and its potential impact on the future development and re-
leases of biotechnology as an illustration. Although Syngenta received
proper approvals for the use of genetic events MIR162 and Event
5307 in the U.S. and with trade associations like the National Corn
Growers Association prior to their commercialization, the genetic
events were not approved in all markets.4
Part II provides an overview of this class-action litigation and where
it currently stands. Part III discusses the current U.S. regulatory con-
ditions that must be met to receive approval for new varieties of crops
and the requirements put on the industry by trade associations prior
to commercializing the new varieties. Part IV discusses the concept of
regulation by litigation and how litigation can be used to place addi-
tional requirements on industries, and the impacts of the litigation on
the biotechnology industry as a whole. Finally, Part V offers a brief
conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND OF SYNGENTA AG MIR162 CORN LITIGATION
Syngenta developed genetic events MIR162 and Event 5307 and
sold them in products known as Viptera and Duracade—corn-seed va-
rieties that contain traits intended to make resulting corn resistant to
certain pests.5 Syngenta petitioned the USDA to deregulate Viptera in
2007 and Duracade in 2011, and the products were approved for sale
in 2010 and 2013, respectively.6
At the time Viptera and Duracade were approved in the United
States, China, where the products were not approved,7 was becoming
a larger purchaser of U.S. corn. In 2012, China imported 2.7 million
metric tons of corn, or roughly 106 million bushels, and it was esti-
mated that China represented almost 20 percent of the U.S. corn-ex-
port market in 2013.8 Also in 2013, China found traces of Viptera in
the Deregulation of Genetically Modified Crops, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 353 (2012)
(discussing the birth of recombinant-DNA technology, genetically modified crops,
and Roundup Ready).
4. See, e.g., In re Syngenta AG MIR162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1186
(D. Kan. 2015).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Non-Producer Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Master Class Action Complaint at
60, In re Syngenta AG MIR162 Corn Litig., No. 14-md-2591-JWL-JPO (D. Kan. Sept.
19, 2016). While the import totals include imports from around the world, “virtually
all” were from the United States. Id.
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corn imports from the U.S. and began rejecting any corn shipment
containing traces of the product, which had been introduced in corn
shipments due to “cross-pollination from neighboring fields” and
commingling at local “grain elevators and other storage facilities.”9
China finally approved Viptera in 2014.10
Over this same period, corn and other commodity prices fell from
mid-2012 highs.11 Many believe this decline could potentially be
traced from lower yields due to a drought in 2012 to record yields in
2013 and 2014, but others have argued the decline is due to the loss of
the Chinese market because of Viptera contamination.12 Suggesting
support for the latter theory, U.S. corn imports to China fell by 85
percent after the discovery of Viptera traces in November 2013.13
In September 2014, U.S. farmers began to file lawsuits against
Syngenta for the disruption to the U.S. corn market caused by the
release of MIR162 when it had not yet been approved in China.14 The
farmers claim that Syngenta violated the Lanham Act and state con-
sumer-protection laws, committed the torts of negligence and trespass
to chattels, and created nuisances.15 A group of Arkansas farmers has
even alleged that Syngenta violated the Racketeer Influenced & Cor-
rupt Organizations Act—the same federal act used to go after mem-
bers of the mafia.16 In December 2014, the U.S. Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation ruled that hundreds of related lawsuits should
be consolidated in the federal district court in Kansas.17
This litigation has been progressing through the stages. It has been
certified as a large class action and, as of the writing of this Article,
has yet to be resolved.18 In 2015, Syngenta brought third-party claims
against grain handlers Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland, alleging
that these companies actively commingled Viptera and Duracade corn
9. In re Syngenta, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1186.
10. See id.
11. See Kristine A. Tidgren, Syngenta Litigation Still Pending Despite China’s
Viptera Approval, IOWA ST. U. CTR. FOR AGRIC. L. & TAX’N (Dec. 27, 2014), https://
www.calt.iastate.edu/article/syngenta-litigation-still-pending-despite-chinas-viptera-
approval [https://perma.cc/98VU-MDHH].
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See In re Syngenta, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1186.
15. See id.; Non-Producer Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Class Action Complaint at
100–15, In re Syngenta, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177 (D. Kan. 2015) (No. 14-md-2591-JWL-
JPO).
16. See Jan Cottingham, State Farmers Allege GMO Corn Conspiracy, ARK. BUS.,
Feb. 23, 2015, at 10, WLNR 37144521.
17. See In re Syngenta AG MIR162 Corn Litig., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1401 (J.P.M.L.
2014).
18. In re Syngenta AG MIR162 Corn Litig., No. 14-md-2591-JWL-JPO, 2016 WL
5371856 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2016). The first bellwether trial is scheduled to begin in
June 2017. See Scheduling Order No. 2, In re Syngenta AG MIR162 Corn Litig., No.
14-md-2591-JWL-JPO (D. Kan. Oct. 21, 2015).
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with the rest of the corn supply.19 The court ruled these claims were
preempted by the U.S. Grain Standards Act (“GSA”),20 which states:
No State or subdivision thereof may require the inspection or
description in accordance with any standards of kind, class, quality,
condition, or other characteristics of grain as a condition of ship-
ment, or sale, of such grain in interstate or foreign commerce, or
require any license for, or impose any other restrictions upon the
performance of any official inspection or weighing function under
this chapter by official inspection personnel.21
The court agreed with the grain handlers that “whether [the grain]
contains the trait found in Viptera” was a characteristic under the
GSA, that congressional intent was to fully regulate foreign commerce
of grain, and that Syngenta was preempted from bringing a state-law
tort claim against the grain handlers.22
In the fall of 2016, the district court certified nine classes in this
litigation.23 These nine classes include one nationwide class and eight
statewide classes for producers in Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and South Dakota.24 The classes are de-
fined to allow all corn producers in the U.S. or in one of the eight
states “who ‘priced their corn for sale after November 18, 2013,’ ex-
cluding Court personnel, Syngenta personnel, and government enti-
ties.”25 The bellwether cases are scheduled for trial in June 2017.26
19. Syngenta’s Third-Party Complaint, In re Syngenta AG MIR162 Corn Litig.,
No. 14-md-2591-JWL-JPO, 2016 WL 1312519 (D. Kan. Apr. 4, 2016) (No. 14-md-
2591-JWL-JPO); see also Kristine A. Tidgren, Syngenta Fires Back, IOWA ST. U. CTR.
FOR AGRIC. L. & TAX’N (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.calt.iastate.edu/article/syngenta-
fires-back [https://perma.cc/R9P4-MFL9] (noting that Syngenta filed a third-party
complaint against Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland); Paul Goeringer, Potential
Ramifications of Agrisure Viptera Class Action Litigation, U. MD.: MD. RISK MGMT.
EDUC. BLOG (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.aglaw.umd.edu/blog/potential-ramifications-
of-agrisure-viptera-class-action-litigation [https://perma.cc/4RLW-BWYB] (also dis-
cussing the third-party complaint).
20. In re Syngenta, 2016 WL 1312519; see also United States Grain Standards Act,
7 U.S.C. §§ 71–87k (2012).
21. § 87g(a) (emphasis added).
22. In re Syngenta, 2016 WL 1312519, at *2–3.
23. See In re Syngenta, 2016 WL 5371856.
24. Id.
25. Id. at *2.
26. See Steven Trader, Final Bellwether Trials Picked in Syngenta Tainted Seed
MDL, LAW360 (Aug. 31, 2016, 3:49 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/834979/fi-
nal-bellwether-trials-picked-in-syngenta-tainted-seed-mdl [https://perma.cc/TSP4-
7AWK].
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\4-3\TWL302.txt unknown Seq: 5 22-AUG-17 9:03
2017] THE CHANGING WORLD OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 377
III. CURRENT REGULATORY BACKGROUND AND TRADE-
ASSOCIATION BACKGROUND
A. Regulatory Background of Biotechnology in the U.S.
In 1986, the Reagan administration announced the Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology.27 This framework was
last updated in 1992, and recently calls have been made to further
modernize it.28 With this framework, the U.S. developed a “risk-based
system to ensure that new biotechnology products are safe for the en-
vironment and human and animal health”29 or an overarching system
to regulate the development of new plant and animal varieties
through the use of recombinant-DNA techniques.30 Under the frame-
work, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”), and Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (“APHIS”) each regulate different aspects of the biotechnol-
ogy system utilizing existing federal laws.31
The APHIS has been granted authority under the Plant Protection
Act (“PPA”) “to prevent the spread of disease and invasive plants by
controlling plant movement within interstate and international com-
merce and restricting release of plant material into the environ-
ment.”32 It considers all newly created plant varieties to be potential
pests that should be regulated under the PPA.33
The EPA regulates biotechnology under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) and the Toxic Substances
Control Act.34 The FIFRA gives the EPA the authority to regulate the
27. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302
(June 26, 1986).
28. See Robbie Barbero, James Kim, Ted Boling, & Julia Doherty, Increasing the
Transparency, Coordination, and Predictability of the Biotechnology Regulatory Sys-
tem, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017, 1:20
PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2017/01/04/increasing-transparency-
coordination-and-predictability-biotechnology-regulatory [https://perma.cc/JP9J-
4DMZ]; Modernizing the Regulatory System for Biotechnology Products: Final Ver-
sion of the 2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotech-
nology, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2017_coordi-
nated_framework_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ9J-DCQT] [hereinafter Moderniz-
ing the Regulatory System].
29. Coordinated Framework: How The Federal Government Regulates Biotech
Plants, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., https://
www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/sa_regulations/
ct_agency_framework_roles [https://perma.cc/BF3R-7H47] (last modified Jan. 27,
2017) [hereinafter APHIS]; see also Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Bio-
technology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302.
30. See Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 3, at 441–42.
31. Id.; see also APHIS, supra note 29; Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302.
32. A. Bryan Endres, Coexistence Strategies, The Common Law of Biotechnology
and Economic Liability Risks, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 115, 120 (2008).
33. Id.
34. Modernizing the Regulatory System, supra note 28, at 10–15.
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registration, manufacturing, and use of all pesticides in the U.S.35
When a newly created plant variety includes a trait to produce a pesti-
cide, it is regulated in the same manner as any other pesticide.36
The FDA regulates the safety of the food system and feed prod-
ucts.37 To ensure the safety of the food system, it looks at the charac-
teristics of a new plant variety and not the methods used to develop
the variety.38 In other words, foods derived from both biotechnology
methods and traditional breeding methods must “meet the same rigor-
ous safety standards.”39
After developing a new plant variety, seed developers will often
face oversight by two or all of these federal agencies. For example,
Syngenta sought approval of the MIR162 genetic event from the
APHIS and EPA, and is subject to enforcement by the FDA.40 This
genetic event produced three pesticide products that controlled
above-ground pests and, thus, required EPA approval.41 And in order
to allow human consumption, the FDA enforces tolerance levels and
residual tolerance levels.42
As you can see, the process for getting a new plant variety deregu-
lated is not easy and often requires years of work. During President
Barack Obama’s administration, a call was made to modernize the ex-
isting system to take into account advances in science since the frame-
work was last updated in 1992.43 The APHIS published a proposed
rule on January 19, 2017, that would have updated the regulatory sys-
tem to reflect these advances.44
It is also important to note that U.S. approval is not the final word
on this issue. New plant varieties also need to be approved in other
countries. As the next Section will highlight, seed companies work to
gain approval in major international markets as required by various
trade associations before new varieties can be marketed in the U.S.45
35. See APHIS, supra note 29.
36. See id.
37. Farquhar & Meyer, supra note 3, at 450.
38. See id.
39. APHIS, supra note 29.
40. U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., SYNGENTA
BIOTECHNOLOGY, INC. INSECT RESISTANT MIR162 CORN: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT 4–5 (2009), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/07_25301_pea.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EVE5-NMYA].
41. See id. at 5.
42. See id.
43. Modernizing the Regulatory System, supra note 28. See generally Exec. Order
No. 13,610, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2013) (“[S]teps should be taken, consistent with law, agency
resources, and regulatory priorities, to promote public participation in retrospective
review, to modernize our regulatory system, and to institutionalize regular assessment
of significant regulations.”).
44. Importation, Interstate Movement, and Environmental Release of Certain
Genetically Engineered Organisms, 82 Fed. Reg. 7,008 (proposed Jan. 19, 2017) (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
45. See infra notes 46 to 52 and accompanying text.
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B. Trade Associations Play a Role in Biotechnology Releases
Trade associations like the National Corn Growers Association
have developed stewardship standards for biotechnology crops.46
These associations require new plant varieties to receive major-mar-
ket approval after being deregulated by the appropriate federal agen-
cies. Developing these stewardship standards, such as requiring major-
market approvals, allows trade associations to manage the economic
issues associated with the releases of new plant varieties.47
For example, when it was discovered that unapproved Liberty Link
rice had commingled with “legal” rice and entered the world market,
massive food safety recalls were triggered in Europe, and the world
price of rice plunged 14 percent.48 Bayer CropScience was forced to
pay out 750 million dollars in settlements as a result.49 And plunges in
world commodity prices and large settlements are just some of the
economic issues trade associations manage through stewardship
practices.
As discussed earlier, the Syngenta class-action suit involves new
corn varieties unapproved for the Chinese market being discovered in
shipments of corn to China. The National Corn Growers Association,
according to its website, requires approval in Japan and that compa-
nies be seeking “approval in all other markets.”50 As another exam-
ple, the North American Export Grain Association has a policy to
require all-major-market export approval prior to commercializing a
new seed variety.51
Although not regulations, these trade associations’ requirements for
major-market approval do set standards that biotechnology-seed com-
panies follow before commercializing a new seed variety. The
Syngenta class-action suit could potentially lead to companies needing
approval in additional markets if the plaintiffs are able to prove negli-
gence due to Syngenta not receiving Chinese approval before
marketing.
A less onerous potential change could be better education of pro-
ducers on unapproved varieties to keep segregated based on market
approval. This would be similar to what is currently being done with
46. Thomas P. Redick, Coexistence of Biotech and Non-GMO or Organic Crops,
19 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 39, 56–57 (2014).
47. See id.
48. See RASH BEHARI BHATTACHARJEE, LIBERTY LINK RICE: A TRUE STORY OF
GE RICE CONTAMINATION (2009), http://library.ipamglobal.org/jspui/bitstream/ipam-
library/429/1/Liberty%20Link%20Rice.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJA6-94V8].
49. Bloomberg News, Bayer Settles with Farmers over Modified Rice Seeds, N.Y.
TIMES (July 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/business/02rice.html.
50. Know Before You Grow, NAT’L CORN GROWERS ASS’N, http://www
.ncga.com/for-farmers/know-before-you-grow [https://perma.cc/DR7H-WB26].
51. Letter from Gary C. Martin, President and CEO, N. Am. Exp. Grain Ass’n,
Inc., to Colleagues (Apr. 4, 2006), http://www.naega.org/images/AP%20for%20Sync_
4-4-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX4S-V322].
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identity-preserved crops.52 However, expanded segregation of vari-
eties would require additional standards from grain handlers, and as
will be discussed later in this Article, incentives may not currently ex-
ist for segregation.
IV. REGULATION BY LITIGATION
A. Regulation by Litigation Background
One aspect of the Author’s job as an extension specialist is assisting
agricultural producers in understanding the implications of pending
lawsuits, legal and regulatory changes, and other legal issues. The Au-
thor has considered the implications of the Syngenta lawsuit insofar as
how new biotechnology will come on the market if the litigation is
successful. Essentially, this regulation by litigation will add additional
requirements that biotechnology companies like Syngenta must meet
before bringing a new product to market.
Many critics see regulation by litigation as costing billions of dollars
and forcing public participation out of the rulemaking process.53 Pro-
ponents see the process, also called “sue and settle,” as a way around
powerful political interests and as a path towards regulatory
changes.54 As will be discussed, the process has been successfully used
by the environmental and health-care lobbies.
Regulation by litigation began in the 1990s.55 The idea is that “agen-
cies use enforcement actions against regulated entities to create new
substantive obligations for the regulated.”56 Agencies “use the threat
of a catastrophic loss in litigation to coerce agreement to forward-
looking, substantive regulatory provisions in a settlement.”57 This pro-
cess adds additional regulations and requirements on an industry—
while allowing agencies to bypass normal administrative processes
such as notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Regulation by litigation allows governmental agencies or private ac-
tors to place regulations on a company or industry using powers they
may lack.58 An often-cited example of this is the Tobacco Master Set-
52. See DENNIS STRAYER, IDENTITY-PRESERVED SYSTEMS: A REFERENCE HAND-
BOOK 89 (2002).
53. See, e.g., Andrew Grossman, Regulation Through Sham Litigation: The Sue
and Settle Phenomenon, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2014/02/regulation-through-sham-litigation-the-sue-and-settle-phe-
nomenon [https://perma.cc/VZ8T-ARH4].
54. See Bruce Yandle et al., Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists: Regulating To-
bacco by Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225, 1240–43 (explaining and opposing this
view).
55. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 179, 181 (2005).
56. Id.
57. Yandle et al., supra note 54, at 1240.
58. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Regulation by Litigation, ENGAGE, Feb. 2008, at 109,
110.
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tlement Agreement, which effectively imposed a tax on the future
sales of cigarettes in all states.59 No state legislature imposed this tax
through the constitutional path to impose taxes; instead, the tax was
created by the actions of state attorneys general.60 Imposing taxes is
not a power traditionally assigned by state constitutions or the U.S.
Constitution to attorneys general. As has been pointed out by some
commentators, “the attractiveness of regulation by litigation is exactly
this—that it enables regulators to assume powers that they otherwise
lack.”61
Regulation by litigation has been used in agriculture as well. In
2004, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) an-
nounced stricter rules for the discharge of manure by dairies.62 The
City of Waco was involved in the administrative rulemaking process,
and many of its comments were ultimately rejected by the TCEQ.63
The City then filed suit against fourteen dairies seeking to impose the
proposed regulations rejected by the TCEQ.64 The City asserted
claims using the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) against the dairies claiming
they had improperly stored and transported manure in the waterways
of the state and causing phosphorus pollution in Lake Waco.65 Ac-
cording to one scholar, “[t]he use of CERCLA in this manner is a
newly devised litigation shortcut to avoid the thorough and sometimes
disappointing results of statewide environmental regulation.”66
In the end, the City of Waco reached a settlement with the dairies67
that included a requirement that the dairies sign what was essentially
an additional permit with the City limiting field applications of
waste.68 The settlement allowed the City to effectively enforce its pro-
posed regulations against dairies in Erath County, Texas—even
though they had been rejected by the TCEQ.69
The City of Waco case demonstrates how regulation by litigation
can be effectively used as an end around the regulation process. The
TCEQ had rejected the City of Waco’s proposals for the revised regu-
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. E.g., id.
62. Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 29 Tex. Reg. 6,652 (July 9, 2004);
30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 321.31 (2017).
63. See Jim D. Bradbury, Regulation Through Litigation: CERCLA and CAFOs,
AGRIC. MGMT. COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Amer. Bar Ass’n Section of Env’t, Energy, &
Res., Chicago, Ill.), Apr. 2007, at 15, 16.
64. Id.
65. First Amended Complaint, City of Waco v. Schouten, 385 F. Supp. 2d 595
(W.D. Tex. 2005) (No. W-04-CA-118).
66. Bradbury, supra note 63, at 16.
67. Settlement Agreement, City of Waco v. Schouten, No. W-04-CA-118 (W.D.
Tex. Jan. 17, 2006).
68. Bradbury, supra note 63, at 16.
69. Id.
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lations on dairies. Rejection of these proposed regulations should
have allowed the TCEQ to develop regulations that worked for all
parties, but it did not. Instead, the City was able to implement its pro-
posed regulations through a settlement agreement with the dairies.
These are just a few examples of how regulation by litigation can
operate. Private actors can also bring claims that if successful can es-
sentially impose new regulations. As the next Section will highlight,
the Syngenta class-action suit may similarly have the impact of requir-
ing biotechnology companies to comply with additional standards
prior to bringing a new plant variety to market.
B. Regulation by Litigation: The Syngenta Class Action
As discussed in the previous Section, regulation by litigation is one
way to add additional requirements on an industry without going
through the traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking process. The
Syngenta class action presents a different type of regulation by litiga-
tion. Instead of a public actor suing an industry like the tobacco indus-
try or truck manufacturers, we have private agricultural producers
suing a single biotechnology company. A victory for the plaintiffs in
this case would produce the same results as regulation by litigation by
a public actor.
As discussed previously, biotechnology companies work to get new
plant varieties approved by the appropriate federal agencies (the
APHIS, EPA, and FDA). While companies are working through this
process, they are also working on getting approval in major foreign
markets as required by trade-association standards—and also to en-
sure that the new varieties will be accepted in world markets.
A victory by the plaintiffs could potentially expand the require-
ments placed on biotechnology companies. If Syngenta is found to
have violated the duty of care owed to growers by not receiving ap-
proval in China prior to commercializing MIR162, biotechnology
companies may have to obtain approval in additional markets before
commercializing a new variety in the United States. Requiring addi-
tional markets to approve will likely delay market entrance for new
plant varieties.
The question then becomes how companies determine the markets
in which to seek approval. Could the Syngenta class action potentially
cause seed companies to go beyond approval with major trading part-
ners and seek approval in those markets the USDA is merely project-
ing to become major trading partners after the new variety is
commercialized?
Prior to 2008, China was a net exporter of grain,70 and prior to the
2009–2010 grain-marketing year, U.S. corn exports to China were
70. James Hansen & Fred Gale, China in the Next Decade: Rising Meat Demand
and Growing Imports of Feed, U.S. Dep’t Agric. Econ. Res. Serv.: Amber Waves
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fewer than 1 million metric tons per year.71 But this figure surged to
over 5 million by the 2011–2012 grain-marketing year.72 Since the dis-
covery of MIR162 in shipments to China, corn exports to China have
dropped back down to fewer than 1 million metric tons in the
2014–2015 and 2015–2016 grain-marketing years.73 USDA projections
since the 1990s had overestimated the true pace at which China would
import grains due to increased demand for livestock and feed grains.74
Determining which projections to use could potentially be an issue for
seed companies. If using improper projections is seen as negligent, will
biotechnology companies moving forward be required to get approval
in all markets?
However, biotechnology companies do have potential options be-
yond seeking approval in unknown markets. They could consider
utilizing agreements with growers who want to grow new varieties not
approved for all potential trading partners (such as China prior to the
spike in 2011–2012) to only take the grain to non-export locations. For
instance, with an earlier release of Agrisure RW MIR604, designed to
control rootworms in corn, Syngenta required producers to sign agree-
ments before purchasing the MIR604 seeds to grow.75 These agree-
ments required producers to agree only to deliver to non-export
locations, and Syngenta required them until the MIR604 variety had
received major-market approval in Japan.76
As discussed by Bryan Endres, Syngenta’s commercialization prior
to major-market approval was denounced by the trade associations
and seen as putting the U.S.’s corn and corn-product export markets
at risk.77 The corn-export market consists of not just corn, but also
distillers dried grain and solubles (“DDGS”),78 corn meal, and corn
flour, among other products. Looking solely at DDGS, total world ex-
ports in the 2016–2017 marketing year are expected to be about $713
million for the U.S.79
During harvest time, producers may not be able to take all neces-
sary precautions to ensure that these plant varieties end up at non-
export locations. The plant varieties in question (new biotechnology)
(Apr. 7, 2014), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2014/april/china-in-the-next-
decade-rising-meat-demand-and-growing-imports-of-feed [https://perma.cc/R4W4-
Q3SS].
71. Kim Dillivan, U.S. Corn Exports to China, IGROW (Jan. 14, 2015), http://igrow
.org/agronomy/corn/u.s.-corn-exports-to-china [https://perma.cc/M6N6-XSDU].
72. Id.
73. U.S. Grains in All Forms Exports, U.S. GRAINS COUNCIL, http://www
.grains.org/market-data/feed-grain-exports-in-all-forms (enter “China” in “Type
Country Name” field).
74. See Hansen & Gale, supra note 70.
75. Endres, supra note 32, at 129.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. A byproduct of ethanol production used in livestock feeds.
79. U.S. Grains in All Forms Exports, supra note 73.
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are not the normal varieties the market is designed to segregate for,
such as organics and GMO-free.80 Producers are not receiving a price
premium for growing them as they do with organics, and they may be
unlikely to segregate these varieties from other varieties, even with
agreements.81
The other issue is whether not just producers, but also the proces-
sors and handlers, will segregate the new plant varieties. Will an etha-
nol plant be able to handle the segregation burdens to ensure these
unapproved varieties stay out of the DDGS export market?82 Even if
segregating varieties may be an option to limit the need for approval
in unknown markets, processors and handlers may not be equipped to
handle the burdens of segregation.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article highlights many of the challenges faced by grain pro-
ducers in deciding whether to participate in a large class-action lawsuit
involving agricultural biotechnology. Many producers rely on the in-
novation that new varieties allows them to grow food more efficiently,
at lower costs, and with higher yields. Producers also rely on the fact
that when new varieties are put on the market, the varieties will be
approved for export to our trading partners.
The Syngenta class-action litigation highlights what can happen
when a country increases exports of a commodity containing unap-
proved varieties—the loss of exports to the country that has not ap-
proved the variety and a decrease in the worldwide price for the
product.
As this Article discusses, some potential outcomes of this class-ac-
tion lawsuit could increase requirements on biotechnology companies
associated with the release of new plant varieties. These new require-
ments could potentially range from increasing the markets approval is
required in prior to releasing plant varieties to segregating new vari-
eties not yet approved for export to all countries. Each of these re-
quirements could present problems for both producers and the
biotechnology companies.
Regardless of the outcome of the litigation, it will be interesting to
see how biotechnology companies and producers react and adapt to
the continued importance of advances in biotechnology in agriculture.
80. Endres, supra note 32, at 127.
81. See id. at 127–28.
82. See generally id. at 129–30 (noting the enormity of this burden and projecting
that plants would likely leave the export market entirely).
